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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 10, 1997, the Federal Reserve Board (Board)
announced its approval of the notice of NationsBank Corporation to
acquire Montgomery Securities of San Francisco, an investment
banking firm with total consolidated assets of $2.5 billion.' The
newly acquired section 20 subsidiary, now known as NationsBanc
Montgomery Securities, L.L.C., will have the backing of $21 billion
in equity capital,' which will enable it to broaden its stock and bond
trading and enhance its ability to conduct larger securitized
transactions. NationsBank will be able to offer its customers a broad
range of financial products, through the subsidiary, which plans to
retain its emphasis on research and investment banking.4 This
dramatic development was made possible by the Board's
promulgation of new Operating Standards for section 20 subsidiaries,
which allow bank holding companies (BHCs) access to traditionally
non-banking areas.'
On August 21, 1997, the Board ordered substantial revisions
to the regulatory regime that limits BHCs' affiliation with
subsidiaries engaged in securities underwriting and dealing
1. See Order Approving Notice to Engage in Certain Non-Banking Activities, 83 Fed.
Res. Bull. 924, 927 (1997).
2. See NationsBanc Montgomery Securities Addendum to the 1997 Annual Report,
(date visited Feb. 28, 1998) <http:lwww.nationsbancmontgomery.com/mont-info/annual-
report/add.html>.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See infra note 40 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 14-17 and
accompanying text (explaining why banks, until very recently, have been barred from
involvement in investment activities). See generally John W. Milligan, Bankers Who
Would be Brokers, U.S. BANKER, Oct. 1997, at 26 (describing the flurry of BHCs'
acquisition of securities firms, including First Union of Wheat First Butcher Singer
Securities, Bankers Trust of Alex Brown & Co., BankAmerica of Robertson, Stephens &
Co., CIBC of Oppenheimer, and SBC Warburg of Dillon, Reed & Company).
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activities.6 These limitations, previously dubbed "firewalls," 7 were
replaced by a significantly truncated and modified set of eight
Operating Standards.! The Board believes that these new standards
will increase the competitiveness of BHCs in the delivery of one-stop
financial services, while simultaneously protecting bank depositors
from the conflicts of interest that arguably arise with the affiliation of
commercial and investment banking activities.9
This Comment briefly describes the well-entrenched
arguments for and against the historical restrictions on the
involvement of traditional banks in investment banking activity.10
The Comment next reviews each of the old firewalls, focusing on the
reasoning behind the Board's decision to abandon some limitations
and retain others in the new Operating Standards." Then the
Comment examines the objectives of the Board's changes, and
discusses the extent to which these objectives are reflected in the new
Operating Standards. 2 Finally, the Comment concludes that the
Board's Operating Standards successfully maintain a reasonable yet
vigilant approach to financial industry oversight, by striking a
balance between the benefits of open and free competition and the
safety and soundness of circumspect fiscal policy. 3
II. BACKGROUND
Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall), 14
6. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y);
Amendments to Restrictions in the Board's Section 20 Orders, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,295 (1997)
[hereinafter Regulation Y Amendments] (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
7. See id. at 45,296.
8. See id. The Order lists the coverage of the Operating Standards as "capital
requirements for bank holding company and section 20 subsidiary; internal controls;
interlock restrictions; customer disclosure; credit for clearing purposes; funding of
securities purchases from a section 20 affiliate; reporting requirement; and application of
sections 23A and 23B to foreign banks." Id. at 45,297.
9. See id.
10. See infra notes 14-36 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 37-159 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 160-90 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
14. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994). The Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall) was part of the
Banking Act of 1933. See THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAWS OF SECuRTIS REGULATION §
19.5 (3d ed. 1996).
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enacted in the wake of the Great Depression, mandates that a
member bank of the Federal Reserve System is barred from
affiliation with any company that is "engaged principally" in
underwriting and dealing in securities.'5 At the time of Glass-
Steagall's enactment, the financial industry, indeed the entire
country, was reeling from an economic meltdown that some
attributed, at least in part,'6 to the involvement of traditional banks in
the underwriting and dealing of securities. 7 Modem studies of the
Great Depression, however, reveal that the logic behind Glass-
Steagall's enactment may have been fundamentally flawed.'8
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 377.
16. Whether one takes the position that bank practices contributed to the 1929 Crash or
that banks merely were not immune to the tolls exacted on any other sector of the economy,
the effects of the Crash upon banks, and the repercussions which followed, cannot be
denied. "The great number of banks in the hands of receivers created a situation in which a
very large number of persons were unable to meet their obligations or to get the use of their
funds." Vincent Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence and the Banking System: The Policy Basis
for Continued Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 647,
654 n.30 (1986). See generally Don More, Note, The Virtues of Glass-Steagall: An
Argument Against Legislative Repeal, 1991 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 443 (arguing that
retaining Glass-Steagall is central to the stability of U.S. banking).
17. The sentiment of the times is best captured by recalling the words of Sen. Glass:
In large degree, the (Federal Reserve) system has been transformed into
an investment'banking system, whereas the fixed purpose of Congress
was to set up a commercial banking system and to preclude speculative
operations .... Let me tell (the) Senators the meaning, and, in the last
analysis, the result of that sort of administration of the law. It means
that a member bank may engage in any sort of speculative business it
may please, and then, when its reserve in the Federal Reserve Bank is
impaired, it may take its eligible paper for rediscount and use the credit
and the currency thus afforded to reestablish its reserve, and not to
relend for commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes ... . It was
never intended that its facilities should be used for any investment
purposes, or for speculative purposes, in that roundabout way.
Di Lorenzo, supra note 16, at 657-58 n.45 (quoting 75 CONG. REc. 9,884 (1932)).
18. See William E. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future: Life Without Glass-
Steagall, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 281, 286 (1988). In 1988, a presidential task force studying
the Great Depression reported the following:
[T]he condition of the banking system seems to have followed rather
than led the decline in the level of real economic activity... . IT]he
Great Depression appears to have been caused not by the stock market
Crash but by the interaction of a number of diverse circumstances (such
as the declines in agriculture and housing) and misguided policies (such
as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, the tight monetary policy in late 1931 and
the tax increase in the summer of 1932). Thus, as long as a similar set
of circumstances and policy initiatives are avoided, a comparable
economic contraction should remain only a remote possibility.
Id. at 286 n.22 (quoting PREsmiDEriAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANiSMS, REPORT,
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Consequently, some believe that a large portion of the regulatory
structure that exists today, which was spawned in the post-
Depression New Deal era, is derived from a misinterpretation of
history. 19 Indeed, the current Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
Alan Greenspan, seems to favor this view. 20
Nevertheless, many commenters favor a continued separation
of investment and commercial banking based on one of two major
thought paradigms; the first is the subtle hazards theory. This theory
concerns itself with the possibility of a liquidity shortfall in the wake
of undermined public confidence in the banking system.21 This
theory finds support from the "prisoner's dilemma"22 hypothesis
STUDY VIII: A COMPARISON OF 1929 AND 1987 at VIII-3, VIII-10 (1988)).
19. See id. at 287. Cf Robert M. Garsson, Most Major Nations Are Said to Permit
Securities Underwriting Within Bank, AM. BANKER, Oct. 6, 1995, at 2 (describing a report
that found only four of forty-six nations [Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and the United
States] required underwriting affiliates to be separate from their parent banks and subject to
firewall regulations).
20. See Isaac & Fein, supra note 18, at 287. Professors Isaac and Fein quote current
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan as stating: "[R]esearch over the past 50
years concludes, contrary to Congress' view at the time, that bank securities activities were
not a cause of the Great Depression and that banks with securities affiliates did not fail in
proportionately greater numbers than banks more generally." Id. at 287 n.23 (quoting The
Financial Modernization Act of 1987 and the Financial Services Oversight Act: Hearings
on S. 1886 and S. 1891 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-11 (1987) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal
Reserve Board)).
21. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630-31 (1971) ("[Commercial
bank involvement in securities activities] places new promotional and other pressures on the
bank which in turn create new temptations. For example, pressures are created because the
bank and the affiliate are closely associated in the public mind, and should the affiliate fare
badly, public confidence in the bank might be impaired."); see also Di Lorenzo, supra note
16, at 667. This argument is not premised on actual financial soundness, but perception:
The viability of banking institutions depends not only on long-term
profitability, but on public perception of profitability and safety.
Without this public perception, banks immediately experience customer
risk aversion: an unwillingness to leave funds on deposit. As a result,
they may suffer a liquidity crisis (which produces insolvency), even
though prospects for long-term profitability remain positive.
Id.
22. See David G. Odel, Puzzling Banking Law: Its Effect and Purposes, 67
U. COLO. L. REV. 477, 523 (1996). The prisoner's dilemma is described as follows:
[I]solated individuals, if faced with a one-time prospect of either
choosing to act on faith that another isolated individual will act
harmoniously or choosing to act without relying on the other isolated
individual to act harmoniously, will rationally choose the latter even if
the rewards for harmonious action are known by both isolated parties to
be higher.
Id. at 523 n.137.
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which, applied in the "bank run" context, theorizes that individual
depositors have an incentive to withdraw funds if there is even a hint
of possible insolvencyY The proponents of this line of thought
assert that the fungible nature of bank operations, at least to
individual depositors, makes it particularly vulnerable to liquidity
insolvency, since the bulk of those funds can be withdrawn on
demand.24 The advocates of the subtle hazards doctrine find support
for their view of a potential liquidity crisis from a snapshot
comparison of bank activities during the Great Depression and the
present time, which reveals a similarity in bank asset allocation. 5
Although deposits have been somewhat diminished as a liability on
banks' balance sheets,26 the subtle hazard contingent would argue
that such a liquidity crisis, conjuring images of the bank run27 in "It's
a Wonderful Life,"28 remains a distinct possibility.
The second argument against the collapse of the partition
between commercial and investment banking is that the enhanced
equity capital2 9 made available to investment banks that associate
23. See id. at 523. Professor Odel describes a bank run as follows:
Depositors know that banks maintain only a fraction of their deposits in
reserve to facilitate routine payment functions and occasional depositor
withdrawals. If depositors believe that an economic harm is likely to
befall the bank or its customers that might later render the bank
insolvent, individual depositors have an incentive to withdraw their
funds first. If many depositors run to the bank to beat one another in a
withdrawal race, however, those depositors can collectively hasten a
bank's demise.
Id.
24. See Di Lorenzo, supra note 16, at 667.
25. See Odel, supra note 22, at 523. A direct comparison demonstrates the similarity in
commercial banks' asset allocation: "For instance, 57.8% of all commercial bank assets
were held in the form of loans in 1929, compared with 56.23% of commercial bank assets
in 1993; 21.9% of commercial bank assets in 1929 were invested in securities, compared
with 25.38 % in 1993." Id. at 523-24 n.139 (quoting BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1021 (1989); Profit and Balance
Sheet Developments in U.S. Commercial Banking in 1993, 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 483, 498
(1994)).
26. See id. at 523-24. In 1929, the liabilities of commercial banks from customer
deposits was 79%, but by 1993 they had dipped to 60%. See id. at 524 n.140.
27. See id. at 523; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
28. IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946).
29. See Nationsbanc Montgomery Securities Addendum to the 1997 Annual Report,
supra note 2. Addressing the enhanced financial resources of Montgomery Securities upon
its acquisition by NationsBank: "Our global distribution of equities and large block trading
will continue to distinguish us in the marketplace. But with the backing of $21 billion in
equity capital, we will expand stock and bond trading .... Id. (emphasis added).
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with major BHCs exacerbates the speculative nature of the stock
market and increases the likelihood of a painful crash.30  Referring
back to the 1920's, advocates of this viewpoint assert that bank
involvement in equities diverted large amounts of America's
financial resources to the stock market, and created the frothy
speculation that preceded the 1929 Crash.3 Like the proponents of
the subtle hazards theory, this group of dissenters to the convergence
of commercial and investment banking maintains a remedial goal of
limiting banks to their traditional commercial banking function as
providers of credit.32
The supporters of increased commercial bank participation in
investment banking activity, conversely, assert that bank
involvement in securities activities before the Depression was not the
cause of the Crash.33 Therefore, they argue that the premise behind
separating investment and commercial banking is, to a large extent, a
fallacy.34 Furthermore, they assert that insistence upon an artificial
separation of commercial and investment banking, wrought by a
cumbersome, repetitive scheme of regulations, does nothing but
decrease the competitiveness of banks in an ever-demanding
financial marketplace.35 Supporters of increased bank powers claim
that banks have already been assaulted by intrusions into many of
their traditional domains,36 warranting a corresponding entry of banks
into the securities business to meet the diverse demands of
customers.
30. See More, supra note 16, at 441.
31. Seeid. at441-42.
32. See id. at 440; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the
Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85
MICH. L. REv. 672, 716-17 (1987). See generally Di Lorenzo, supra note 16, at 649-57.
33. See Isaac & Fein, supra note 18, at 285.
34. See id. at 285-90.
35. See id. at 281; see also Avoid Firewalls That Are Too Strong, Volcker Tells
Banking Committee, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) 732 (1995) (reporting that "[former Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker] said that having firewalls that completely insulate
the commercial bank from the investment bank operations in an affiliated group will
frustrate financial institutions' attempts to capitalize on economic synergies and
organizations' desire 'to operate as a coherent whole."').
36. Non-traditional depositor options, such as money market funds, have proliferated
among broker dealers, including on-line securities brokers, resulting in a diversion of
billions of dollars from the traditional holder of deposits, banks. See Joseph M. Heppt,
Note, An Alternative to Throwing Stones: A Proposal for the Reform of Glass-Steagall, 52
BROOK. L. REV. 281, 297 (1986).
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III. THE NEW OPERATING STANDARDS FOR SECTION 20 SUBSIDIARIES
A. Background
The Glass-Steagall Act37 prohibits a member bank of the
Federal Reserve System from being affiliated with a company that is
"engaged principally" in underwriting and dealing in securities that
the bank itself would be ineligible to deal in or underwrite.38 Since
1987, the Board has promulgated a series of orders which allow bank
holding companies (BHCs) to establish section 20 subsidiaries39 to
engage in activities which the BHC itself can not. While providing
the BHCs access to securities activities, the Board also established
limitations on such activities.4° The bulk of these limitations, or
firewalls, were adopted in the Board's first Order allowing BHCs,
through their section 20 subsidiaries, to underwrite and deal in
commercial paper, municipal bonds, and related securities.4' Other
firewalls were added in 1989 when the Board announced that the
section 20 subsidiaries could underwrite and deal in all varieties of
equity and debt securities.42  The restrictions were instituted to
37. 2 U.S.C. § 377 (1994).
38. See id.
39. Section 20 subsidiaries are investment banking firms that "engage in activities
associated with securities underwriting, making a market in securities, and arranging
mergers, acquisitions and restructuring .... Investment banking also includes the services of
brokers or dealers in secondary market transactions... ." James R. Smoot, Bank Operating
Subsidiaries: Free at Last or More of the Same? 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 651, 657 n.24 (1997)
(quoting ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 661 (Charles J. Woelfel ed., 10th ed.
1994)).
40. See H. Rodgin Cohen, Section 20 Affiliates of Bank Holding Companies, 1 N.C.
BANKING INST. 113, 114-15 (1997); see, e.g., J.P. Morgan & Co., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192
(1989); Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987). A major limitation upon BHCs acquisition
of securities firms was the "engaged principally" test, which in 1987 limited the gross
revenues of the section 20 subsidiary that could be derived from bank ineligible activities to
five percent. See Cohen, supra, at 114-15. In 1989, the Board raised this limit to 10%; in
1996 the limit was raised to 25%. See id. at 115-16; see also Revenue Limit on Bank-
Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies Engage in Underwriting
and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (1996) (announcing the Board's decision to
raise the limit). Although this liberalization is not addressed within the new Operating
Standards, it was a watershed event that stimulated the recent proliferation of section 20
subsidiaries. Cf Milligan, supra note 5, at 26 (describing several recent BHC acquisitions
of securities firms).
41. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,295 (1997).
42. See id. at 45,296.
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prevent the risk associated with the securities industry from being
shifted to a federally insured bank, and "to mitigate the potential for
conflicts of interest, unfair competition, and other adverse effects that
may arise from the affiliation of commercial and investment
banks." 43
On January 8, 1997, the Board proposed to modify the
existing firewalls by abrogating some and consolidating others into a
new set of Operating Standards." As noted previously, the Board
explained that this new scheme would prudently address the need to
eliminate unnecessary regulatory compliance burdens, while
recognizing the wisdom of retaining the limitations that the Board's
experience had indicated was warranted. 45  The Board stated that
most of the risk from the alliance of commercial and investment
banking is limited by the general BHC regulations, and by the
securities laws and regulations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), and securities exchanges that apply to every broker-dealer,
including section 20 subsidiaries.46 Nevertheless, the Board declared
that it was hesitant to dismantle all of the firewalls, because certain
unique dangers inherent in the union of commercial and investment
banking were not addressed in any other existing legislative or
regulatory scheme.47 This Comment discusses the previous firewalls
in order and explains their status within the new Operating
Standards.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 45,296-97.
46. See id. at 45,296; see also Jane E. Willis, Banks and Mutual Funds: A Functional
Approach to Reform, 1995 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 221, 241-42 (arguing that sections 23A
and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act mitigate against the 'subtle hazards' allegedly arising
from the combination of commercial and investment banking).
47. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,296-97. To illustrate the need
for these very limited but important additions to existing, non-firewall law, the Board
provided the example of a customer who might be confused between commercial and
investment bank products. See id. at 45,296.
[Vol. 2318
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B. The Old Firewalls and Their Status Within the New
Operating Standards
1. Capital Requirements
Firewall l(a) required BHCs to maintain adequate capital
notwithstanding the funds they invested and treated as capital within
their section 20 subsidiary.48 Firewall l(b) required the same rule as
to credit extended to the section 20 subsidiary." The Board
rescinded the requirement that the capital or credit extended to the
section 20 subsidiary be deducted from BHC capital, citing the
accounting inconsistencies and inconveniences such a practice
engenders." The Board decided, however, to retain the requirement
that BHCs must maintain adequate capital." The Board also reserved
its discretion to intervene, on a case by case basis, to restrict credit
enhancements and excess capital flow from the BHC to the section
20 subsidiary. Operating Standard #1 is the result of the Board's
attempt at properly balancing the concern that BHCs might engage in
overly speculative activities with the interest in promoting financial
services competition; it strips away duplicative compliance burdens
while retaining a right for Board intervention and requiring banks to
maintain adequate capital. 3
Firewall 2 required that BHCs obtain prior approval from the
Board before making any investment in a section 20 subsidiary. 4
This firewall was repealed upon the issuance of the proposal for the
new Operating Standards.5
Firewall 3 required BHCs to submit to the Board a detailed
demonstration of how both the BHC and the section 20 subsidiary
48. See id. at 45,297.
49. See id.
50. See id. ("The capital deductions (and resulting deconsolidation for regulatory
capital purposes) are inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
and have therefore created confusion and imposed costs by requiring bank holding
companies to prepare financial statements on two bases.").
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 45,298.
55. See id.
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would maintain adequate capital 6 In promulgating Operating
Standard #1, the Board rescinded the requirement of a capital plan,
since upon application for a section 20 subsidiary, liquidity reserves
in the new operation will be fully examined by the Board.
Firewall 4 required a section 20 subsidiary to maintain
adequate capital "to support its activities and cover reasonably
expected expenses and losses in accordance with industry norms." '
The fear was that a section 20 subsidiary (cognizant of the financial
and reputational strength of the BHC that owns it) might allow its
capital to be maintained at low levels and rely on the BHC to bail it
out, if necessary." The Board rescinded this requirement to the
extent that it is inconsistent with the compliance burden other broker-
dealers face, such as the SEC's requirement of keeping capital above
"early warning" levels.' The only compliance in excess of other
broker-dealers is that when capital reserves fall below the "early
warning requirement," the section 20 subsidiary must notify the
56. See id.
57. See J.P. Morgan & Co., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989). The Board was initially
quite conservative in forming the firewalls, seeking to err on the safe side regarding
potential dangers from the affiliation of commercial and investment banking activities. See
id. However, through a series of orders since 1987, the Board has removed strictures which
have proven unnecessary. For example, the Board removed the requirement that banks
receive prior approval before any investment in section 20 subsidiary when the Board
proposed the new Operating Standards earlier this year. See id. But see More, supra note
16, at 441. See generally Di Lorenzo, supra note 16, at 648-57. These commenters take
the position that the original intent of the Congress in enacting Glass-Steagall is
unequivocal: keep investment and commercial banking separate. See id. Thus these
commenters believe that retaining firewalls concerning the adequacy of capital, while not
going far enough, would be preferable to the continued erosion of the divide between the
two activities. See id.
58. Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,298.
59. See id.; see also note 29 and accompanying text. It appears that securities firms
will
seek to market this newly acquired financial backing as a strength that distinguishes the
firms who have merged with a major commercial bank from those which have not. Such
pronouncements are a rather ominous development for those who fear the overexposure of
commercial bank reserves to the more speculative securities activities of the section 20
subsidiaries, and would appear to reinforce the move towards financial services
consolidation.
60. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1 1(1994) (requiring broker-dealers to comply with strict
capital requirements and transmit a report to the SEC within 24 hours of any failure to so
comply). This seems to address the concerns of those who urge that the Board might be
unable to act to protect depositors until it is too late, assuming that a firm which fails to
meet its capital requirements would not also be likely to avoid full and prompt disclosure.
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Board as well as the SEC.' The Board concluded that since it
already measures BHC capital on a consolidated basis that includes
the section 20 subsidiaries, the ability of a section 20 subsidiary to
leverage its relationship with its parent BHC would be limited.62
2. Extension of Credit to the Customers of the
Underwriting Subsidiary
Firewall 5 prohibited a section 20 subsidiary from "extending
credit or issuing or entering into a stand-by letter of credit, asset
purchase agreement, indemnity, guarantee, insurance or other facility
that might be viewed as enhancing the creditworthiness or
marketability of a bank ineligible securities issue underwritten or
distributed by the underwriting subsidiary. 63 The Board rescinded
this firewall, reasoning that this is the very type of excessive
regulation that hampers the ability of BHCs to be full service
financial services providers." In addition, the Board pointed to
existing overlaps with non-firewall protections, including the
requirement that BHCs must hold capital to cover credit
enhancements given to the customers of its section 20 subsidiaries65
and the requirement that such extensions of credit must be on market
terms after a careful, independent credit evaluation, rather than
61. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,298. A respondent to the
Board's solicitation of public comments urged the Board to adopt the SEC rule on the
rationale that capital reserves vary greatly from firm-to-firm and from day-to-day,
concluding that a minimum rather than average standard for capital adequacy for the section
20 subsidiary would be appropriate. Another commenter urged that as a practical matter,
the adequacy standard is unnecessary, since section 20 subsidiaries must maintain large
amounts of capital so that they can withdraw it when a significant underwriting opportunity
arises.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 45,298-99. The Board gave the following example:
For example, existing corporate customers of the bank may wish to
issue commercial paper or issue debt in some other form. Although
the bank may refer the customer to its [s]ection 20 affiliate, the bank is
prohibited from providing credit enhancements even though it is the
institution best suited to perform a credit analysis-and, with smaller
customers, perhaps the only institution willing to perform a credit
analysis.
Id. at 45,299.
65. See id.; see also supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
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preferentially allocated.6
Firewall 6, to a limited extent, prohibited BHCs and their
subsidiaries, including section 20 subsidiaries, from financing the
purchase of a security which the agent in question knew was being
underwritten by the section 20 subsidiary. 7 The limitation extended
from the period of the underwriting to thirty days thereafter. 8 In
addition, Firewall 6 included situations where the section 20
subsidiary was to be the market maker for the security.69 This
knowledge-based prohibition is known as the "Chinese wall," 70
which restricts information flow on a "need to know" basis in an
66. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c-l(a)(1) (1994). A bank and its section 20 subsidiary have
complied with the "market terms" requirement only when transactions are:
(A) On terms and under circumstances, including credit standards, that
are substantially the same, or at least as favorable to such bank or its
subsidiary, as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions
with or involving other nonaffiliated companies, or (B) [I]n the
absence of comparable transactions, on terms and under circumstances,
including credit standards, that in good faith would be offered to, or
would apply to, non-affiliated companies.
Id. One need not be a cynic to see the potential for abuse of this "market terms"
requirement. When valuation of a security is at issue, it seems likely that many different
factors might be considered-and some weighted more heavily than others. This flexibility
indicates that the meaning of "market terms" is quite elastic, leaving some room for
transactions with favorable terms.
67. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,299. Section 23B of the Federal
Reserve Act instructs that the following transactions are covered by the market terms
requirement:
(A) Any covered transaction with an affiliate. (B) The sale of securities
or other assets to an affiliate, including assets subject to an agreement
to repurchase. (C) The payment of money or the furnishing of such
services to an affiliate under contract, lease, or otherwise. (D) Any
transaction in which an affiliate acts as an agent or broker or receives a
fee for its services to the bank or to any other person. (E) Any
transaction or series of transactions with a third party- (i) if an affiliate
has a financial interest in the third party, or (ii) if an affiliate is a
participant in such transaction or series of transactions.
12 U.S.C. §371c-1 (a)(2).
68. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,299.
69. See id.
70. A Chinese Wall is defined as:
[A] notional information barrier between the parties of a business,
especially between the market making part of a stockbrokerage firm and
the brokering part. It would clearly not be in investors interests for brokers
to persuade their clients to buy investments from them for no other reason
then that the market maker in the firm, expecting a fall in price, were anxious
to sell them.
TBE OXFoRD DIC'nONARY FOR THE BUSINESS WoRLD 141 (1st ed. 1993).
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effort to eliminate conflicts of interest without the need of a
burdensome paper trail.7"
The Board decided to retain most of this firewall and embody
it in Operating Standard #6. The new standard, however, no longer
prohibits extensions of credit where the section 20 subsidiary is a
mere market maker of the security rather than an underwriter.
According to the Board, the potential conflict of interest as a market
maker was too attenuated to justify the disallowance of credit
extensions and to therefore invoke the knowledge-based compliance
requirement.7 Several commenters urged the Board to rescind
firewall 6 in its totality, reasoning that as a practical matter, banks
would not make a bad loan just to earn a small fraction of those
potential losses on the sale of securities.74 In addition, commenters
pointed to existing, non-firewall compliance requirements that they
felt duplicated firewall 6.75 Nevertheless, the Board concluded that
71. See Eric T. Young, Fall ofSection 20 Firewalls Will Raise New Challenges, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 12, 1997, at 3 (suggesting that the move towards greater affiliation of
activities should not be taken lightly by those bankers who are responsible for ensuring
compliance with the new Standards). Among the new challenges is the implementation of
training to address the differences that the "chinese wall/need to know" rules mean, in order
to preserve the confidentiality of proprietary client information. See id. For example,
bankers should not presume that the disappearance of some firewalls allows sharing of all
client information. See id.
72. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,299. An underwriter acquires
and distributes initial issuances of securities whereas a market maker regularly purchases
and sells particular securities in the over-the-counter secondary market. See HAzEN, supra
note 14, at §§ 4.24, 10.3 (3d ed. 1996).
73. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,300.
74. See id. at 45,299.
75. See id. The Board explained:
Several commenters noted that [s]ection 11(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 addresses some of the same concerns as firewall
6. Section 11(d) prohibits a broker-dealer (including a section 20
subsidiary) that is acting as an underwriter from extending or arranging
credit to customers purchasing the newly issued securities during the
underwriting period and for 30 days after the underwriting period.
Thus a section 20 subsidiary acting as an underwriter would be
prohibited from arranging for an affiliated bank to make loans to
customers for purchases during an underwriting period ....
Commenters also noted that section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act
would apply to loans to fund purchases by customers of securities from
a section 20 affiliate during the existence of the underwriting or selling
syndicate, and to any loan to purchase a security from the inventory of
the section 20 affiliate, including securities in which the section 20
affiliate makes a market.
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the existing non-firewall limitations did not go far enough to address
the full range of potential abuses that such credit extensions could
engender.76 However, the Board did heed the urging of a commenter
who argued for an exception to the prohibition of extending credit to
a customer during the underwriting period and thirty days thereafter
while the customer had a preexisting line of credit. The Board
attached two qualifications to this exception: "(1) the line of credit
[must] not [be] entered into in contemplation of the purchase of
affiliate-underwritten securities, and (2) either the line of credit is
unrestricted or the extension of credit is clearly consistent with the
restrictions imposed."78
Firewall 7 prohibited BHCs and their subsidiaries from
lending to the BHCs section 20 subsidiary for the purpose of the
payment of principal, interest, or dividends on securities. 79  The
Board rescinded this firewall, reasoning that the potential conflict of
interest that the firewall contemplated, namely the temptation of the
BHC to make unwise loans to strengthen the condition of companies
which its section 20 subsidiaries had underwritten, is "more
attenuated than those present when credit is extended during the
underwriting period."80  In so doing, the Board continued its
consistent theme of rescinding firewalls which necessitated extensive
compliance costs,8' but gave little further protection in return. In
76. See id. The Board explained:
Section 1 (d) does not apply to a bank loan unless the loan is arranged
by an affiliated broker-dealer, and although section 23B requires the
loan to be on market terms, the Board has some concern that during an
underwriting period, when the market value of the securities is
uncertain, section 23B may not be an adequate protection. In sum, the
Board has concluded that existing law is not a complete protection
against the conflicts of interest that arise when a bank lends during the
underwriting period or for 30 days thereafter.
Id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 45,299-300.
79. See id. at 45,300.
80. Id. The Board believes that once an underwritten company makes it to market, the
pecuniary and reputational risks to the section 20 subsidiary are lessened. See id.
81. See id. For instance, banks formerly faced compliance difficulties in the renewal of
credit lines if their section 20 subsidiary was involved in a past underwriting of the
company. In such a situation, banks previously had to pursue circuitous, costly
mechanisms of credit line renewal, such as recruiting another bank to participate in the
process. See id.
[Vol. 2
NONBANK SUBSIDIARYACTIVITIES
addition, the Board noted that section 23B of the Federal Reserve
Act requires any lending in these circumstances to be on market
terms if the section 20 affiliate is a participant in the transaction. 2
Firewall 8 was an administrative corollary to firewall 7; it
required banks to have extensively documented records that provided
evidence as to the purpose and intent of the loan to the section 20
subsidiary."' The rationale for this firewall was to ensure that the
credit was not extended to meet a section 20 subsidiary's ongoing
obligations related to the payment of principal, interest, or dividends
on a bank-ineligible activity. The Board, consistent with its
rescission of firewall 7, considered this requirement superfluous
since sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act require this
extension of credit to be on market terms."5
Firewall 9 prohibited the extension of credit for the payment
of a thrift's ongoing principal, interest, or dividend obligations on a
bank-ineligible activity; like firewall 8, firewall 9 has been rescinded
as superfluous.86 In addition, firewall 10, which restricted credit
extensions to parties that are major users of projects financed by
industrial revenue bonds, was rescinded on the same grounds as the
firewalls that restricted the issuers of such extensions of credit.
Firewall 11 mandated that parent BHCs cause their subsidiary
banks to promulgate operating guidelines governing the subsidiary
banks' lending activities with the parent bank's section 20
subsidiary.8 The clear intent of this firewall was to block the evasion
by a parent BHC of the strictures of the firewalls by setting up a
subsidiary bank to extend credit in situations where the BHC could
not. The Board retained this firewall and incorporated it into
Operating Standard #2.9 The Board justified the continuation of this
compliance requirement by indicating its concern about abuses
arising from an unrestricted relationship between BHC lending
82. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 371 c-l(a)(3) (1994).
83. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,300.
84. See id.
85. See supra notes 66-67.
86. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,300.
87. Seeid. at45,301.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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subsidiaries and section 20 subsidiaries. 9°
Firewall 12 required BHCs to devise policies to prevent
overexposure to the risks inherent in allocating too many of its assets
to a single customer of a section 20 subsidiary.91 The Board has
rescinded this firewall, citing its continuing right to review BHC
operations and exposures, and to intervene and demand divestiture of
assets overcommitted to a single section 20 subsidiary customer.92
3. Interlocking Directors and Officers Restrictions
Firewall 13 prohibited "directors, officers or employees of a
BHC from acting as a majority of the board of directors or the chief
executive officer of an affiliated section 20 subsidiary, and directors,
officers or employees of a section 20 subsidiary from serving as a
majority of the boards of directors or the chief executive officer of an
affiliated bank."93  Furthermore, in order to prevent customer
confusion regarding the federal insurability of bank deposits but not
certain securities options offered by the section 20 subsidiary, the
firewall mandated the maintenance of separate offices. 94
The Board decided to maintain the prohibition on interlocks,95
citing its symbolic (and possibly legal) importance in maintaining the
separate corporate identities of the bank and its section 20
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. Again, the Board demonstrated its preference for stripping away restrictions
that are either duplicated elsewhere or whose cost inefficiency undermines competitiveness.
It could be asserted, however, that by the time the Board concludes that a maverick bank
has overexposed itself, the damage may have already been done. It is this fear that
underlies the dissenting subtle hazards school of thought, which postulates that once
members of the public know that a bank took a big loss from its exposure to a customer of
its section 20 subsidiary, they will quickly withdraw their funds (since to a depositor, banks
are fungible), leading to a liquidity crisis at the bank and setting off a possible chain
reaction of missed obligations among lenders. See Di Lorenzo, supra note 16, at 667. This
reasoning, however, arguably relies upon a hypothetical public reaction which is irrational
because depositor money is protected by Federal Deposit Insurance, the foundational
bulwark of bank regulatory policy.
93. Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,301.
94. See id.
95. Interlocking directors "serve simultaneously on the boards of directors of two or
more corporations that have dealings with each other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 815 (6th
ed. 1990).
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subsidiary. The Board, however, decided to rescind the separate
office requirement,97 reasoning that this prohibition is already
covered by the Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Non-deposit
Investment Products.9" That statement instructs that retail sales by a
section 20 affiliate should be conducted in a physical location that is
distinct from the area in which retail deposits are being taken.99 The
Board also indicated that where the sharing of offices is in a non-
retail context, the separation of banks from their section 20
subsidiary "serves no purpose and represents a needless expense.
The above-described changes will be promulgated as Operating
Standard #3.
4. The Disclosure Requirements for Section 20 Underwriting
Subsidiaries
Firewall 14 required section 20 affiliates to disclose their
alliance with the BHC, including a special statement specifically
describing the differences between the two corporations.' The key
provision was the disclosure that the securities operations of the
section 20 subsidiary, unlike the deposits taken by the bank, are not
insured. 02 The Board decided to keep this firewall, with slight
modifications as a result of replacing the firewall with the provisions
found under the Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit
96. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,301. The result is that the
piercing of the bank's corporate veil may be more difficult for the section 20 subsidiary's
potential creditors.
97. See id.
98. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, AND THE
OFFICE OF THIuFT SUPERVISION, INTERAGENCY STATEMENT ON RETAIL SALES OF
NONDEPosrr INVESTMENT PRODUCTS (1994), available in WESTLAW, FFIN-FRRS
database (FRRS 3-1579.5 1) [hereinafter INTERAGENCY STATEMENT].
99. See id.; Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,301.
100. Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,301.
101. See id.
102. See id. The Board related that the firewall instructed that:
securities sold, offered, or recommended by the underwriting subsidiary
are not deposits, are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, are not guaranteed by an affiliated bank or thrift, and are
not otherwise an obligation or responsibility of such a bank or thrift
(unless such is the case).
1998] 327
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
Investment Products.03  In addition, the Interagency Statement
disclosure requirements will apply to those activities conducted off
bank premises. t4 Several commenters challenged this view, arguing
that since the purpose of the disclosure requirement was to prevent
customer confusion regarding the applicability of Federal Deposit
Insurance to their securities activities, the maintenance of separate
locations should be sufficient to properly inform the customer."'
However, the Board thought it judicious to always inform the retail
customer of the implications of dealing with the separate entities
including, most importantly, the absence of Federal Deposit
Insurance for section 20 investments."° The amended firewall will
be incorporated into Operating Standard #4.
5. Restrictions on Marketing Activities on Behalf of Underwriting
Subsidiary
Previously, firewall 15 prohibited advertisements by the
section 20 subsidiary or any affiliated bank that expressly or
implicitly indicated that the parent BHC or a subsidiary bank would
be responsible for any losses by the section 20 subsidiary.0 7 The
Board has rescinded this firewall,0 8 indicating that it is duplicated by
section 23(B) of the Federal Reserve Act. 9 Firewall 16, which
restricted cross-marketing and agency activities by banks, was
rescinded in 1996.110
103. See id. at 45,301-02; see also INTERAGENCY STATEMENT, supra note 98. Operating
Standard #4 will be both narrower and broader than the existing firewall. It will be
narrower in that the disclosure will not be required to institutional investors (whose level of
sophistication makes such disclosure requirements wasteful) and broader in that the
Interagency Statement requires an acknowledgment of the required disclosure by the retail
customer. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,301-02.
104. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,301-02.
105. See id. at 45,302.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 371 c-l(c) (1994) ("A member bank or any subsidiary
or affiliate of a member bank shall not publish any advertisement or enter into any
agreement stating or suggesting that the bank shall in any way be responsible for the
obligations of its affiliates.").
110. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,302; see also Review of
Restrictions on Director, Officer and Employee Interlocks, Cross-Marketing Activities, and
the Purchase and Sale of Financial Assets Between a Section 20 Subsidiary and an
[Vol. 2328
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6. Restrictions on Investment Advice
Firewall 17 prohibited a BHC from expressing an opinion on
the value of bank-ineligible securities that were either underwritten
by or dealt in by the BHCs section 20 subsidiary, unless the BHC
revealed the nature of its relationship to the customer."' The Board
decided to retain this firewall with an important alteration: the
evaluation of a particular security by a bank employee is not
prohibited unless that employee has knowledge of the section 20
subsidiary's involvement in the security."2 Thus the Chinese wall
theory"3 will govern; sensitive information will be divulged to
employees on a "need to know" basis to avoid the problems
associated with updating every bank employee about each transaction
in which the section 20 subsidiary is involved." 4 Again, the Board is
being sensitive to the efficiency needs of banks, while
simultaneously recognizing the inherent potential of conflicts of
interest. These changes will be incorporated into Operating Standard
#4.
Firewall 18 restricted BHCs and their subsidiaries from
purchasing securities for a period of sixty days if their section 20
subsidiary was the underwriter or a market maker in that security for
an unlimited period, unless the contractual agreement expressly
provided authorization for such purchases."5 The Board rescinded
this firewall, citing overlap with section 23B(b)(1)(B) of the Federal
Reserve Act which prohibits the same activities when a bank or thrift
is making the purchase." 6 Unlike previous firewall 18, section 23B
does not extend the prohibition for sixty days past the underwriting
period."7 Furthermore, section 23B does not apply to BHCs or their
non-bank subsidiaries when they buy securities in a fiduciary
Affiliated Bank or Thrift, 61 Fed. Reg. 57,679, 57,683 (1996) (rescinding firewall 16).
111. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,302.
112. See id.
113. See supra note 70.
114. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,302.
115. See id. at 45,302-03.
116. See id. at 45,303; see also 12 U.S.C. § 371 c-1 (b)(1)(B)(1994).
117. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,303.
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capacity."18 Noting these differences, the Board explained that other
regulations which prohibit such activities will apply if the entity is
purchasing on behalf of a pension fund (when ERISA"l9 will apply),
or on behalf of a mutual fund (governed by sections 10 and 17 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940120). Thus the Board believes
adequate safeguards will remain.1
2 1
7. Restrictions on Extension of Credit and Purchases and Sales of
Assets
Firewall 19 prohibited BHCs and their subsidiaries from
buying bank-ineligible securities underwritten by a section 20
subsidiary or affiliate.'2 The firewall was intended to block a section
20 subsidiary from dumping an unattractive issue on its affiliates.'
In practice, however, affiliated banks were denied access to all
offerings placed through their section 20 subsidiaries, while
unaffiliated banks could pick and choose the offerings with the most
potential; this disparity created a disincentive to underwrite the more
attractive offerings. 24 Citing section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act
as an appropriate limitation that adequately balances the potential
conflict of interests with the bank's desire to make legitimate
securities purchases, the Board rescinded firewall 19.125 In addition,
the Board noted that since 1989, banks have been allowed to place up
to fifty percent of an issue of securities underwritten by their section
20 subsidiary with their non-bank affiliates, and no known abuses
118. See id.
119. Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§
1002(21), 1104 (1994).
120. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10, 80a-17 (1994).
121. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,303.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. The prohibition extended to all issues, removing from consideration those
issues which even from the most conservative view were objectively attractive. See id.
125. See id. The Board related that section 23B "prohibits a bank from purchasing any
security for which a section 20 affiliate is a principal underwriter during the existence of the
underwriting or selling syndicate," unless such a purchase has been approved by a majority
of the bank's disinterested directors. Id. In addition, section 23A requires the bank to hold
capital against any such purchases, and limits such bank purchases to investment grade
securities. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
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have been recorded. 26 As it had done with other old firewalls, the
Board has stripped away an artifice that was duplicated, to a large
extent, by preexisting regulation. Moreover, the Board continued
their emphasis on a "market terms" requirement in any such
transaction."
Firewall 20 prohibited a section 20 subsidiary from either
underwriting or making a market in any bank-ineligible security that
was issued or represented an interest in any of its affiliates, unless the
security was rated by an independent rating organization or
guaranteed by Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA),
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FIILMC), or
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). s The Board
rescinded this firewall, citing a similar NASD rule which requires
compliance by any broker-dealer section 20 subsidiary as an
adequate safeguard to combat unjustified bank purchases.' 9 Once
again, the Board demonstrated its disdain for unnecessary,
overlapping compliance burdens, which add transaction costs that
detract from a bank's competitiveness.
Firewall 21 was a broad ban on extensions of credit to a
section 20 subsidiary by the BHC or any other affiliate of the section
20 subsidiary.'30 This firewall was designed to prevent a BHC from
attempting to bail out imprudent underwritings of their section 20
subsidiary.'3 ' The concern was that absent such a firewall, a BHC
might make unwise extensions of credit, which directly conflict with
126. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,303.
127. See id.
128. See id. For general information about the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), and the Government
National Mortgage Association (GNMA), see Fannie Mae's Past and Future (visited Mar.
1, 1998) <http://www.fanniemae.com/Homebuyer/HouseAm/ha hist .html>; Ten
Frequently Asked Questions About Freddie Mac (visited Mar 1, 1998)
<http://www.freddiemac.com/tenquest.htm#1)>; Guides to the Programs of HUD's GNMA
(Government National Mortgage Association (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.
hud.gov/local/millwisggnma.html>.
129. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,303 (citing NASD Rule 2720
(1997) (providing three requirements: (1) the security must be independently grade-rated,
(2) the price or yield of the security must also be set by an independent entity, and (3) if the
security is an equity security, there must be an independent secondary market in such
security)).
130. See id. at 45,303-04.
131. See id. at 45,304.
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its fiduciary duty to depositors. '3  The Board rescinded this firewall,
except that to the extent intra-day (same day) credit extensions are
made, they must be made on market terms.' The revised provision
will be known as Operating Standard #5. 31 In addition, the Board
noted that existing rules within section 23A will still govern.35
Operating Standard #8 adopts identical provisions to Operating
Standard #5, but in the context of foreign bank extensions of
credit. 136
Firewall 22 prohibited a BHC from purchasing the financial
assets of a section 20 subsidiary, or selling bank assets to the
subsidiary; the only exception was for assets which possessed
publicly-available market value quotations, which would ensure the
transaction was on market terms. 37 The concern was that absent
such a restriction, this asset sale situation would provide a funding
opportunity that undermined the purposes of firewall 21, which had
prohibited direct credit extensions. 38 The Board has rescinded this
firewall, again relying on section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act to
set quantitative limits on such transactions, to prohibit the purchase
of a low quality assets from an affiliate, and to require such
purchases to be on market terms. 13 9 The Board sounded a note of
caution, however, by instructing section 20 subsidiaries that relying
solely upon the BHC for funding is an imprudent decision. 40
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). The Board stated that a bank: [w]ill still
have to deal with the [s]ection 20 affiliate on market terms, will be prohibited from
purchasing low-quality assets from the affiliate,and will be prohibited from purchasing
securities underwritten by a [s]ection 20 affiliate during the existence of the underwriting or
selling syndicate period unless a majority of the bank's outside board of directors approves.
Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,304.
136. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,307.
137. See id. at 45,304-05.
138. See id. at 45,305.
139. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 371.
140. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,305. The Board provides
unsolicited financial advice by noting: "[A]s a safety and soundness matter, [the Board]
generally emphasizes that [sjection 20 subsidiaries should develop diverse funding sources.
Thus, a [s]ection 20 subsidiary should not rely on repurchase agreements with an affiliated
bank as its sole funding source." Id.
[Vol. 2332
NONBANK SUBSIDJARYACTIVITIES
8. Limits on the Transfer of Information
Firewall 23 prohibited a BHC from disclosing any nonpublic
customer information to any of its subsidiaries, including its section
20 affiliate, unless the customer in question specifically consented to
such transfer of information. 4' The Board had proposed to retain
this provision, but decided to rescind it in response to extensive
dissent to the firewall by commenters who argued that BHCs were
being put at a competitive disadvantage by the requirement.4 2 The
Board pointed to existing rules that prevent abusive practices in such
exchanges of information, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act 43
and state consumer privacy statutes, 44 as providing adequate
protection in the absence of such a firewall. 45
9. Reports Required by the Federal Reserve Board
Firewall 24 required BHCs to submit quarterly reports to the
Federal Reserve; these reports had to include extensive information
regarding the activities of the BHCs section 20 subsidiary.' 6
Continuing in its theme of disclosure and vigilant monitoring of
section 20 subsidiaries, the Board decided to retain this provision,
which now will be known as Operating Standard #7.147
10. Scope of an Approval of Section 20 Subsidiary
Firewall 25 limited the scope of an order approving a section
20 subsidiary to the specific approval sought in the application. 48
The firewall stated that the Board must reevaluate any revised
structure of the BHC and its subsidiaries, since otherwise further
141. See id.
142. See id. The Board was persuaded that investment banks who were unaffiliated with
a bank were gaining the access through participation in joint-lending operations, and that
such a rescission was necessary to level the playing field between banks with section 20
subsidiaries and those without. See id.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
144. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53B (1994).
145. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,305.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
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corporate structural changes might be misunderstood as falling
within the initial approval.149  The Board decided to rescind this
firewall, explaining that individual notices of approval are
sufficiently detailed to clearly enunciate the extent of Board
approval.150
11. Limits on Reciprocal Arrangements and Discriminatory
Treatment
Firewall 26 prevented BHCs and their subsidiaries from
agreeing with other banks or their subsidiaries to enter into any
arrangement designed to evade firewalls or any other regulatory
requirement.151 The Board decided to rescind this firewall, citing
section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970 52 as containing a special per se prohibition on such reciprocal
arrangements.'53
Firewall 27 prohibited BHCs from extending more favorable
terms to an affiliated section 20 subsidiary than to a competitor of its
section 20 subsidiary. 54 The Board rescinded this firewall, citing
existing prohibitions on discriminatory dealings and the recently
enhanced ability of investment banks to obtain credit 55 as sufficient
to mitigate such activities. 6
12. Infrastructure Review Prior to Commencement of Section 20
Activities
Firewall 28 required a comprehensive Board review of a
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1) (1994).
153. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,305.
154. See id. at 45,306.
155. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, §
104(b)(1), 110 Stat. 3423 (1996) (repealing § 8(a) of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78h(a) (1994), which restricted investment bank funding sources to commercial banks and
other broker-dealers).
156. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,306. For example, the Board
pointed to section 106 of the Bank Holding Act Amendments of 1970, which prohibits
banks from conditioning the availability of a particular discount on the customer's
agreement not to deal with the bank's competitors. See id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1) (1)).
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BHCs entire infrastructure before approval was granted to begin any
bank-ineligible operations through a section 20 subsidiary.'57 The
Board decided against incorporating such a broad inspection into an
operating standard, but the Board retained its right of general
oversight. Thus the Board will continue to examine the institutions
in light of the specific application at hand. 58 The new review
process, by focusing on the proposed affiliation itself, will be much
more efficient than an all-inclusive review of each firm's financial
details. This comports with the Board's commitment to provide an
efficient path to approval and consummation of section 20 subsidiary
operations."9
IV. ANALYSIS
The Board, in promulgating the new Operating Standards, followed
several themes, both stated and implied. These themes represent the
doctrinal priorities of the Board, our nation's financial gatekeeper.
This Section will describe the stated and implied objectives of the
revised regulations, and will examine how these themes are applied
in each of the Operating Standards.
A. Objectives of the Operating Standards
The Board summarized its overall theme in promulgation of
the Operating Standards when it described its desire to "eliminat[e]
those restrictions that have proven to be unduly burdensome or
unnecessary in light of other laws or regulations." 60 For example,
firewall 8, which required bank holding companies (BHCs) to adopt
policies and procedures for extensions of credit to their section 20
subsidiaries, met its demise on the grounds that section 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act' already required such extensions of credit to
be on market terms. '6  The purpose of this and other changes to the
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 45,295.
161. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (1994).
162. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,300.
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old firewalls was to increase the competitive position of BHCs in
delivering a wider range of financial options to their customers by
reducing unnecessary compliance costs.163
In addition, the Board followed several unstated themes in
refining its regulations. First, the changes imply that the Board
believes that sunlight is the most powerful disinfectant. That is, the
Board apparently feels that open disclosure is a valuable weapon
against potential abuses, as evidenced by the promulgation of
Operating Standard #4.'" That standard requires (1) an explanation
to the customer of the differences between traditional bank products
and investment bank products, and (2) disclosure that the BHCs
section 20 subsidiary was involved in an issue's underwriting or
market making whenever a bank employee with knowledge of such a
connection recommends such securities.'65
Second, the Board evidently believes that compliance with
"market terms" can be the vaccine for abusive possibilities in the
section 20 relationship." Yet two contrary arguments may be
asserted that such a reliance is misplaced. First, in the securities
context, value (or price) is a relative factor, mobile at every second
and measurable by differing valuation standards. It seems possible
that such a yardstick might be too skittish a standard to gauge
compliance, especially when market terms are being set by the very
institution tempted to exploit such an expansive standard. Second,
the Board's retention of a strict prohibition against certain activities,
as where a bank lends during the underwriting period or thirty days
thereafter, 167 demonstrates its recognition that reliance on the market
163. See id. at 45,296; see also Patricia A. McCoy, The Notional Business Judgment
Rule in Banking, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1031, 1044 (1995) (asserting that the loosening of
restrictions on BHCs involvement in securities activities resulted from the presence of
securities firms in traditional banking activities).
164. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
165. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,301-02.
166. Throughout the Operating Standards, this often is the default policing mechanism
that the Board embraces. See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text (dismantling
firewall 5 restriction on credit enhancements); supra note 82 and accompanying text
(removing firewall 7 restriction on extension of credit for repayment of underwritten
securities). But see supra note 66 (detailing the market terms requirement and the inherent
potential for its exploitation). This indeed is one area where the Board must remain
continually vigilant.
167. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text (retaining firewall 6 as Operating
Standard #6).
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will not always adequately address potential abuses in the section 20
relationship. This view, however, can be countered by the assertion
that the most effective deterrent to aberrant bank behavior is our
swiftly punitive equity market. In other words, investors in the
BHCs stock, who are quite naturally interested in the preservation
and enhancement of their own wealth, will adequately motivate a
BHC to wisely allocate capital. Since BHCs do not wish to see an
unforgiving assault on their stock market value, they are likely to
respect shareholder concerns about unfair transactions.
B. The Board's Objectives in the Context of the Operating
Standards
Operating Standard #1 delineates the capital requirements for
banks and their section 20 subsidiaries. In creating the new standard,
the Board rescinded the rule that BHCs must deduct the capital they
invest in their section 20 subsidiary, but maintained a capital
adequacy requirement and reserved the right of the Board to
intervene in the event of unduly speculative investment. 168  This
Standard is representative of the Board's stated desire to strip away
cumbersome regulations, which undermine BHCs competitiveness in
the delivery of financial services by increasing BHCs regulatory
compliance costs. 69
Importantly, the Board correctly balanced this efficiency
concern with the realization that "subtle hazards"'17 are still possible,
by requiring BHCs to maintain adequate capital.'7' This comports
with the concern that BHCs with unbridled discretion might be
tempted to pass too much capital to their section 20 subsidiary,
making the BHC vulnerable to sudden, large withdrawal demands.
Advocates of the subtle hazards theory, however, would urge that
this Standard only operates in the context of a stable marketplace. 172
They theorize that in the event of a massive stock market decline, a
"capital adequacy" standard will be too passive to stem a run on
168. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,306.
169. See id. at 45,295-96.
170. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
171. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,297.
172. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
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banks who are overexposed to stock market risks.' However, the
banking system cannot be presumed to be immune from the losses
encountered in a broad-based market decline. To burden BHCs with
compliance costs based upon the speculative fear of a substantial
market decline ignores the reality that BHCs must compete with
firms unsaddled by these encumbrances. Thus, Operating Standard
#1 properly balances the concern regarding overly speculative
activities with the interest in promoting financial services
competition, by stripping away unduly burdensome compliance
measures while retaining a right for Board intervention and requiring
banks to maintain adequate capital.
Despite the prudence of this measure, one can see the conflict
that it presents with the Board's desire to let the marketplace be the
ultimate check on BHC policy. In other words, why not let the
market influence BHCs to properly allocate their resources, by
decreasing the BHCs stock value in the event of imprudent
investment of bank capital? The Board, however, thought it
necessary to bolster this market incentive with a minimal adequacy
requirement and a right of intervention." This is a prudent decision:
it gives BHCs discretion in investment decisions, but only when
backed by a strong capital reserve. The requirement also serves as a
constant reminder that the Board retains its right to peer over BHCs
shoulders to ensure that depositors' money is not exposed to
unnecessary risk.
Operating Standard #2 embodies the internal controls
requirement retained from firewall 11. The Standard requires a
section 20 subsidiary to construct detailed procedures governing
borrowing from its parent BHC.175 The Board adopted this measure
to prevent circumvention of the strictures on BHCs lending practices
through bank subsidiaries formed to effectuate the same activities.7 6
Although this seems to be a reasonable measure since compliance
will not require anything beyond adherence to the rules applicable to
the parent BHC, the Standard adds unnecessary costs by requiring
173. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
175. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,307; see also supra notes 63-92
and accompanying text.
176. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,301.
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banks to promulgate operating guidelines when a simple direction
from the Board that the rules apply to all subsidiaries might suffice.
However, while creating operating guidelines will surely require
banks to expend some resources in the beginning, the costs will not
be continuous since the guidelines would likely be applicable to all
of the BHCs subsidiaries.
Operating Standard # 3 restricts the interlocking of the BHC
and its section 20 subsidiary.'77 The Board's decision to retain this
restriction represents a desire that BHCs and their section 20
subsidiaries retain individual corporate identities, thereby reducing
the chance of piercing the corporate veil and preventing unduly
tempting conflicts of interest.' Although as a practical matter the
BHC will ultimately provide directional mandates, it is reasonable to
limit the chance that an aggrieved customer of a section 20
subsidiary will be able to recover a judgment against the parent
BHC.
Significantly, the Board rescinded the requirement from
firewall 13 that the section 20 subsidiary retain a separate office.
The Board reasoned that reliance on the Interagency Statement on
Retail Sales of Non-Deposit Investment Products,'79 which mirrors
the requirements of former firewall 13, would suffice. 80 A likely
quarrel with this revision, however, is that the Interagency Statement
requires that retail sales by a section 20 subsidiary be conducted in a
location that is only physically distinct from where retail deposits are
taken; thus, depository transactions and section 20 retail sales could
take place under the same roof. Critics might argue that this creates
confusion over the difference between insured deposits in the bank
and uninsured investments with the section 20 subsidiary. The
Board, however, certainly weighed this "subtle hazard" against the
efficiency goals of the Standards, and decided that the disclosure
requirements of Operating Standard #4, discussed below, would
provide adequate protection for this concern. This approach is
indicative of the Board's theme that disclosure is the answer for
"subtle hazard"-type concerns; that is, if consumers can be
177. See id. at 45,307.
178. See id. at 45,301.
179. IN'ERAGENCY STATEMENT, supra note 98.
180. See id.; see also supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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adequately protected through being informed, why add a compliance
burden that increases transaction costs for banks, thereby
undermining their competitiveness?
Operating Standard #4, which in large part retains the
customer disclosure requirements of firewall 14,8 represents the
tension between the reduction in compliance costs and the Board's
continued concern that consumers realize the implications of placing
their funds with a section 20 subsidiary rather than in a traditional
bank account. While it does seem prudent to disclose the differences
to customers, one can argue that such a disclosure is unnecessary
when the section 20 subsidiary is located off the premises of the
parent BHC. Unaffiliated investment banking firms, the major
source of competition to the section 20 subsidiaries, do not have to
roll out such disclosures, and thereby do not provide as full of a
picture of associated "risk" as do affiliated firms. For example, if a
customer visits investment banking firm A, an affiliate of a BHC,
and is subjected to a litany of risk disclosures, it is quite conceivable
that the same customer might not be as likely to purchase a financial
product or service as he or she would if these "risks" were not
disclosed, which would be the case at unaffiliated investment bank
B. Clearly, customer disclosure to prevent confusion is necessary,
but it need not extend to premises which present no impression that
the products of the investment bank are insured as those of a
commercial bank. The resulting tandible and intangible compliance
costs evidence a departure from the Board's interest in promoting a
fair playing field for affiliated and unaffiliated investment banking
firms. In addition, such an extension of the disclosure requirement
might encourage the inclusion of all activities under one roof, since
the regulatory compliance burden will be the same. In that event, the
combination of activities would ultimately prove much more
confusing than if the section 20 activities were simply conducted at a
separate site.
A better answer might be to allow BHCs to choose between
two options. First, the banking portion of the BHC and the BHCs
section 20 subsidiary could maintain completely separate retail
locations, and avoid the disclosure requirements embodied in
181. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
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Operating Standard #4. Alternatively, they could have separate and
distinct retail locations under one roof, but retain the disclosure
requirements. By adopting this policy, the Board would allow BHCs
to decide whether efficiencies gained by combined operations are
worth the burden of continued disclosures, which may deter
customer purchases.
In addition to the disclosure requirements, Operating
Standard #4 places limits on investment advice when a section 20
subsidiary is involved in the underwriting or market-making of the
security at issue.8 2 This rule, which allows advice on an affiliated
security absent knowledge of the affiliation by the retail agent in
question,183 demonstrates the Board's interest in replacing blanket
prohibitions, which restrict advice and increase compliance costs,
with a less burdensome standard that can adequately protect against
potential conflicts of interest.
Operating Standard #5, the requirement that intra-day credit
from a BHC to its section 20 subsidiary must be on market terms and
must be fully secured,'14 directly implicates the chief concern
regarding investment and commercial bank affiliation. With this
regulation, the Board seeks to ensure that the sizable assets of the
BHC are not imprudently exposed to its section 20 affiliates'
operations. Previously, firewall 21 barred all extensions of credit,
fearing the conflicts between the duty owed depositors and the duty
and incentive to aid the affiliate." 5 Foregoing a complete ban on
such lending, Operating Standard #5 instead seeks to prevent hasty
loan extensions, as might be motivated by a severe decline in the
stock market, made without regard to the normal considerations such
lending would entail, including compliance with market terms. This
approach ensures fair competition, by requiring prudence in such
extensions of credit rather than a blanket prohibition which, in effect,
punishes a section 20 subsidiary simply because of its affiliation with
a BHC.
Operating Standard #6 prohibits an agent of a BHC or its
subsidiary from knowingly financing the purchase of a security
182. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,307.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 45,303-04; see also supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
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underwritten by the section 20 subsidiary during the underwriting
period or thirty days thereafter, absent a pre-existing unrelated line of
credit. 1 6 This is a corollary to the "Chinese wall"'8 7 knowledge-based
regulation embodied in Operating Standard #4. By requiring
knowledge on the part of the lending agent, the Board seeks to curtail
layers of regulation when the same purposes can be achieved through
less restrictive means. Here, requiring the absence of knowledge of
the affiliation means that the incentive to extend credit in
unwarranted situations will be addressed without forcing costly and
continuous bank holding company-wide updates regarding who can
be a customer for lending purposes. Moreover, this regulation
comports with the theme of disclosure. The knowledge-based rule
meets disclosure concerns-no retail agent will be selling a security
(because of Operating Standard 4) or extending loans to purchase a
security (because of Operating Standard 6) that the agent knows has
been underwritten by the section 20 subsidiary, absent full disclosure
of that relationship.'88
Operating Standard #7 certainly aligns with the Board's
theme of disclosure. The regulation requires banks to submit to the
Board copies of their required reporting to self-regulatory
organizations, including detailed information regarding their section
20 activities.8 9 Moreover, it is telling that this requirement, formerly
firewall 24, was retained while other reporting firewalls were
abandoned; the difference is that this reporting requirement
adequately informs the Board of section 20 activities without
creating paperwork beyond that already required for the self-
regulatory bodies. This, of course, comports with the Board's
interest in remaining acutely aware of section 20 activities without
creating undue burdens on banks affiliated with section 20
investment firnms.
Operating Standard #8 essentially extends the same
requirements that U.S. subsidiaries face to foreign affiliates of U.S.
banks.190
186. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,307.
187. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
188. See Regulation Y Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 45,307.
189. See id.
190. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Board's Operating Standards are a consistent set of
requirements that adequately balance traditional concerns regarding
potential abuses inherent in the combination of commercial and
investment bank activities with the reality that BHCs
competitiveness in an increasingly full service environment requires
the peeling away of excess regulatory compliance costs that
undermine banks' ability to compete with other purveyors of
financial services.
Ultimately, the soundness of the Board's operating standards
will be put to the test in the context of a serious stock market decline.
Opponents of bank involvement in investment banking activities
through section 20 subsidiaries rely on psychological theories that,
conveniently, are not readily examined absent such a doomsday
scenario. Dissenters point to market crashes of the past as fodder for
their arguments against bank participation in investment banking
activities, but in reality, every market has its own defining
characteristics that make such analogies tenuous at best.
Admittedly, much of the weakening of the separation
between commercial and investment banking has come in the context
of a sustained bull market-the Dow Jones Industrial Average has
more than quadrupled since the crash of 1987.191 However, one
cannot ignore the fact that financial services institutions, in order to
remain competitive into the next century, must be able to offer a full
range of financial products within appropriate limitations that do not
unnecessarily increase transaction costs. Furthermore, in an
increasingly interdependent global economy, it may be unrealistic to
believe that government-designed protective measures can fully
insulate any significant institution from the calamity of a serious bear
market. To premise unduly restrictive regulations upon such fears
191. See Randy Schultz, The Blackest of Mondays: The Oct. 19, 1987 Crash Reduced
Stock Values by $1 Trillion (last modified Oct. 13, 1997) <http:llcnnfn.com/markets/9710/
13/crashmain/>. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) at the close of business on
October 19, 1987 was 1,738.74. See id. On February 27, 1998, the DJIA closed at
8,545.72. See Markets Diary, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1998, at C1.
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ignores the truth that no one, from an individual to the most complex
multinational financial institution, stands immune from the
inevitably shifting tides of investor sentiment.
R. NICHOLAS RODELLI
